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Abstract
We characterize the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations.
The position value is first presented by the Shapley value of the uniform hyperlink game or
the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, which are obtained from the given hypergraph
communication situation. These results generalize the non-axiomatic characterization of the
position value for communication situations in Kongo (2010) (Int J Game Theory (2010) 39:
669–675) to hypergraph communication situations. Based on the non-axiomatic characteri-
zation, we further provide an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary
hypergraph communication situations by employing component efficiency and a new prop-
erty, named partial balanced conference contributions. The partial balanced conference
contributions is developed from balanced link contributions in Slikker (2005) (Int J Game
Theory (2005) 33: 505-514).
Keywords: Hypergraph communication situation; Position value; Characterization
JEL classification: C71
1 Introduction
The study of TU-games with limited cooperation presented by means of a communication graph
was initiated by Myerson (1977), and an allocation rule for such games, the so-called Myerson
value, was also introduced simultaneously. Later on, various studies in this direction were done
in the past nearly forty years, such as Meessen (1988), Herings et al. (2008), van den Brink
et al. (2011), van den Brink et al. (2012), Be´al et al. (2012) and Shan et al. (2016). Among
them, the allocation rule, named position value (Meessen (1988)), is also widely studied for
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(graph) communication situations. Born et al. (1992) provided a characterization of the posi-
tion value for (graph) communication situations with trees. An elegant characterization of this
rule for arbitrary (graph) communication situations was given by Slikker (2005). While van den
Nouweland et al. (1992) extended the position value to TU-games with hypergraph communi-
cation situations, shortly hypergraph communication situations. They also gave an axiomatic
characterization of the position value for cycle-free hypergraph communication situations. Al-
gaba et al. (2000) extended the position value to union stable systems and characterized it for
a subclass of such systems. However, an axiomatic characterization of the position value for
arbitrary hypergraph communication situations has not yet been found and remains an open
problem. Additionally, the approach of non-axiomatic characterization for the position value,
which deserves to be mentioned, was investigated in Casajus (2007) and Kongo (2010), respec-
tively. Casajus (2007) gave a characterization of the position value by the Myerson value of a
modification of communication situations, called the link agent form (LAF) on graph situations
and the hyperlink agent form (HAF) on hypergraph situations; While, Kongo (2010) provided
unified and non-axiomatic characterizations of the position value and the Myerson value by
using the divided link game and the divided link game with a coalition structure, respectively.
However, we note that the approach due to Kongo (2010) for communication situations does
not work directly for hypergraph communication situations.
The main aim of this paper is to provide both non-axiomatic and axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations. To complete the
non-axiomatic characterization of the position value, we introduce two new games obtained
from the original hypergraph communication situation, called the uniform hyperlink game and
the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, respectively. It turns out that the position value for
hypergraph communication situations can be represented by the Shapley value of the uniform
hyperlink game or the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game. Based on the above non-axiomatic
characterizations, an axiomatic characterization for arbitrary hypergraph communication situ-
ations is proposed by component efficiency and a new property, called partial balance conference
contributions. Component efficiency states that for each component of the hypergraph the total
payoff to its players equals the worth of that component. Partial balanced conference contri-
butions is developed from balanced link contributions which is used to characterize the position
value for (graph) communication situations in Slikker (2005). The partial balanced conference
contributions here deals with the payoff difference a player experiences if another player breaks
one of his hyperlinks. The intrinsical difference between the two balanced properties is whether
the payoff difference of a player experiences is totally or partially attributing to another player.
This article is organized as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given in Section 2.
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Section 3 first introduces the uniform hyperlink game and the k-augment uniform hyperlink
game. By using the two games, we give two non-axiomatic characterizations of the position value
for hypergraph communication situations. Further, we present a key property, called partial
balanced conference contributions. Based on the non-axiomatic characterizations, we provide
an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication
situations by employing component efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions.
Finally, we conclude in Section 4 with some remarks.
2 Basic definitions and notation
In this section, we recall some definitions and concepts related to TU-games and allocation
rules for hypergraph communication situations.
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v) where
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function
defined on the power set of N such that v(∅) = 0. For any S ⊆ N , S is called a coalition and
the real number v(S) represents its worth. A subgame of v with a nonempty set T ⊆ N is
a game vT (S) = v(S), for all S ⊆ T . We denote by |S| the cardinality of S ⊆ N . A game
(N, v) is zero-normalized if for any i ∈ N , v({i}) = 0. Throughout this paper, we consider only
zero-normalized games.
Let Σ(N) be the set of all permutations on N . For any permutation σ ∈ Σ(N), the corre-
sponding marginal vector mσ(N, v) ∈ Rn assigns to every player i ∈ N a payoff mσi (N, v) =
v(σi ∪ {i}) − v(σi), where σi = {j ∈ N | σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of players preceding i in the
permutation σ. The best-known single-valued solution, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)),
assigns to any game (N, v) the average of all marginal vectors. Formally, the Shapley value is
defined as follows.
Shi(N, v) =
1
|Σ(N)|
∑
σ∈Σ(N)
mσi (N, v), for all i ∈ N.
An alternative description of the Shapley value can be provided by employing the Harsanyi
dividends. First, the unanimity game (N, uT ) according to T ⊆ N is the game defined by
uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0 otherwise (Shapley (1953)). Then each game (N, v) can
be written as a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e., v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅} λT (v)uT
where λT (v) =
∑
S⊆T :S 6=∅(−1)|T |−|S|v(S) is called Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi (1959)) of the
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nonempty coalition T ⊆ N . The alternative description of the Shapley value is given as follows.
Shi(N, v) =
∑
T⊆N :i∈T
λT (v)
|T | , for all i ∈ N.
The communication possibilities for a TU-game (N, v) can be described by a (communication)
hypergraph (N,H) where H is a family of non-singleton subsets of N , i.e., H ⊆ HN = {e ⊆
N | |e| > 1}. The elements of N are called the nodes or vertices of the hypergraph that represent
players, and the elements of H its hyperlinks or hyperedges represent conferences in which
all players in a hyperlink have to be present before communication can take place (van den
Nouweland et al. (1992)). A hypergraph (N,H) is called r-uniform if |e| = r for all e ∈ H.
Clearly, a graph (N,L), L ⊆ LN = {e ⊆ N | |e| = 2} ⊆ HN , is a 2-uniform hypergraph and in
this case these hyperlinks are called links. Therefore, hypergraphs are a natural generalization
of graphs in which “edges” may consist of more than 2 nodes.
Let Hi be the set of hyperlinks containing player i in a hypergraph (N,H), i.e. Hi = {e ∈
H | i ∈ e}. The degree of i is defined as d(i) = |Hi|. A node i ∈ N is incident with a hyperlink
e ∈ H, if i ∈ e. Two nodes i and j of N are adjacent in the hypergraph (N,H) if there is an
hyperlink e in H such that i, j ∈ e. Two nodes i and j are connected if there exists a sequence
i = i0, i1, . . . , ik = j of nodes of (N,H) in which il−1 is adjacent to il for l = 1, 2, . . . , k. A
connected hypergraph is a hypergraph in which every pair of nodes are connected. Given any
hypergraph (N,H), a (connected) component of (N,H) is a maximal set of nodes of N in which
every pair of nodes are connected. Let N/H denote the set of components in (N,H) and (N/H)i
be the component containing i ∈ N . For any S ⊆ N , let (S,H(S)) be the subhypergraph induced
by S where H(S) = {e ∈ H | e ⊆ S}. A hypergraph (N,H ′) is called a partial hypergraph of
(N,H) if H ′ ⊆ H. The notation S/H(S) (or for short S/H) and N/H ′ are defined similarly.
A hypergraph communication situation, or simply a hypergraph game, is a triple (N, v,H)
where (N, v) is a zero-normalized TU-game and H is the set of hyperlinks in the hypergraph
(N,H). In particular, if (N,H) is a graph, the triple (N, v,H) is called a communication situ-
ation, or for short a graph game. Let HCSN denote the class of all hypergraph communication
situations with fixed player set N .
Two values, or allocation rules, were well defined for hypergraph communication situations.
The Myerson value µ (Myerson (1977, 1980), van den Nouweland et al. (1992)) is defined by
µ(N, v,H) = Sh(N, vH),
where vH(S) =
∑
T∈S/H v(T ) for any S ⊆ N , and the game (N, vH) is called the point game or
hypergraph-restricted game.
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An alternative value for hypergraph communication situations, the position value pi (Meessen
(1988), van den Nouweland et al. (1992)), is given by
pii(N, v,H) =
∑
e∈Hi
1
|e|She(H, v
N ), for any i ∈ N,
where vN (H ′) =
∑
T∈N/H′ v(T ) for any H
′ ⊆ H. The game (H, vN ) is called the conference
game or hyperlink game.
3 The characterizations of the position value
In this section we shall provide two kinds of characterizations of the position value for hyper-
graph communication situation. The first kind of characterizations is non-axiomatic charac-
terizations of the position value. The position value is presented by the Shapley value of the
uniform hyperlink game or the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, which are obtained from
the given hypergraph communication situation. Another one is an axiomatic characterization,
which can be proven by employing component efficiency and a new property, called partial
balanced conference contributions.
3.1 The non-axiomatic characterization of the position value
In order to show the non-axiomatic characterization, we first introduce the uniform hyperlink
game induced by an original hypergraph communication situation. The definition of the uniform
hyperlink game follows the spirits of the divided link game in Kongo (2010) and the hyperlink
agent form (HAF) in Casajus (2007).
Definition 1. For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN without isolated player, its uniform hyperlink
game (U(H), w) is defined as follows: Let η(H) denote the least common multiple of the
numbers in {|e| | e ∈ H}. Then set
U(H)(i, e) = {(i, e, k) | k = 1, 2, . . . , η(H) · |e|−1}, (1)
U(H)(i) =
⋃
e∈Hi
U(H)(i, e) and U(H)(e) =
⋃
i∈e
U(H)(i, e),
U(H) =
⋃
i∈N
U(H)(i) =
⋃
e∈H
U(H)(e) (2)
w(S) = vN (H[S]) =
∑
R∈N/H[S]
v(R), for all S ⊆ U(H), (3)
where H[S] = {e ∈ H |U(H)(e) ⊆ S}.
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By the definitions of (U(H), w), it is clear that U(H) is obtain from (N,H) by expanding
each i ∈ N to η(H) · |e|−1 nodes according to each hyperlink e ∈ Hi. Every set U(H)(i, e)
consists of precisely η(H) · |e|−1 players of U(H) which are obtained by expanding the player
i ∈ e in hyperlink e ∈ Hi. U(H)(i) is the set of players obtained by expanding i ∈ N in all
hyperlinks Hi and U(H)(e) is the set of players obtained by expanding the members of e ∈ H.
Therefore, it is easy to check that |U(H)| = η(H) · |H| and |U(H)(e)| = η(H) for any e ∈ H.
Remark. The definition of U(H) is similar to the player set of HAF in Casajus (2007), but
there are no hyperlinks or links in U(H) as defined in HAF, and the characteristic functions are
different from each other as well. The characteristic function w here follows the idea from the
divided link game, due to Kongo (2010). The uniform hyperlink game generalizes the divided
link game for graph games to hypergraph games.
For a hypergraph game (N, v,H), we present the following characterization of the position
value in terms of the Shapley value of the uniform hyperlink game (U(H), w).
Theorem 3.1. For any hypergraph game (N, v,H) and any i ∈ N ,
pii(N, v,H) =
∑
l∈U(H)(i)
Shl(U(H), w).
Proof. Let g be a mapping from Σ(U(H)) to Σ(H): For any two hyperlinks e1, e2 ∈ H and
any permutation σ ∈ Σ(U(H)), g(σ)(e1) < g(σ)(e2) if and only if max{σ(l) | l ∈ U(H)(e1)} <
max{σ(l) | l ∈ U(H)(e2)}. Therefore, for any l ∈ U(H)(e) ⊆ U(H), if σ(l)=max{σ(k) | k ∈
U(H)(e)}, then
mσl (U(H), w) = m
g(σ)
e (H, v
N ),
otherwise, we have mσl (U(H), w) = 0. Hence,∑
l∈U(H)(e)
mσl (U(H), w) = m
g(σ)
e (H, v
N ).
It is clear that |Σ(U(H))| = (η(H)·|H|)! and |Σ(H)| = |H|!. For each δ ∈ Σ(H), Σ(U(H)) has
exactly q = |Σ(U(H))|/|Σ(H)| permutations σ1, σ2, . . . , σq such that g(σ′t) = δ for t = 1, 2, . . . , q.
So, we have
1
|Σ(U(H))|
∑
σ∈Σ(U(H))
( ∑
l∈U(H)(e)
mσl (U(H), w)
)
=
∑
l∈U(H)(e)
( 1
|Σ(U(H))|
∑
σ∈Σ(U(H))
mσl (U(H), w)
)
=
1
|Σ(H)|
∑
δ∈Σ(H)
mδe
(
H, vN
)
. (4)
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Therefore, by the definition of the Shapley value, we obtain∑
l∈U(H)(e)
Shl(U(H), w) = She
(
H, vN
)
. (5)
Note that |e| > 1 for each e ∈ H, so there exist at least two players l, l′ ∈ U(H)(e) such
that w(S ∪ {l}) = w(S) = w(S ∪ {l′}) for any S ⊆ U(H) \ {l, l′}. So l and l′ are symmet-
ric in (U(H), w). From the symmetry of the Shapley value, it follows that Shl(U(H), w) =
Shl′(U(H), w) for any two links l, l
′ ∈ U(H)(e). By Eq. (5), for any l ∈ U(H)(e), we have
Shl(U(H), w) =
1
η(H)
She
(
H, vN
)
.
Note that, for each e ∈ H, |U(H)(e)| = η(H). Therefore, we have∑
l∈U(H)(i,e)
Shl(U(H), w) =
|U(H)(i, e)|
η(H)
She
(
H, vN
)
=
1
|e|She
(
H, vN
)
.
The second equation holds by following Eq. (1). Consequently,
pii(N, v,H) =
∑
e∈Hi
1
|e|She
(
H, vN
)
=
∑
e∈Hi
∑
l∈U(H)(i,e)
Shl(U(H), w) =
∑
l∈U(H)(i)
Shl(U(H), w).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The following example illustrates the construction of the uniform hyperlink game and Theo-
rem 3.1.
Figure 1: The hypergraph (N,H) in Example 1 and its corresponding set U(H).
Example 1. Consider the communication game (N, v,H), where N = {1, . . . , 6}, v is the una-
nimity game u{1,2,3} and H = {{1, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 6}, {4, 5, 6}}. Let e1 = {1, 4}, e2 = {2, 5}, e3 =
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{3, 6}, e4 = {4, 5, 6}. By the definition of U(H), we have the following set (also see Fig. 1)
U(H) = {(1, e1, 1), (1, e1, 2), (1, e1, 3); (4, e1, 1), (4, e1, 2), (4, e1, 3);
(2, e2, 1), (2, e2, 2), (2, e2, 3); (5, e2, 1), (5, e2, 2), (5, e2, 3);
(3, e3, 1), (3, e3, 2), (3, e3, 3); (6, e3, 1), (6, e3, 2), (6, e3, 3);
(4, e4, 1), (4, e4, 2); (5, e4, 1), (5, e4, 2); (6, e4, 1), (6, e4, 2) }.
Note that Figure 1 shows the hypergraph (N,H) and its corresponding set U(H). In the set of
U(H), the subsets in which the nodes are encircled by solid lines are developed by the elements
of N and indicated by U(H)(i) for all i ∈ N , while the groups where the nodes are encircled by
dotted lines are derived by the players in each hyperlink of H and represented by U(H)(e) for
all e ∈ H.
By the definition of v, we can calculate the uniform hyperlink game w as follows.
w(S) =
{
1 S = U(H),
0 else.
Hence, Shl(U(H), w) =
1
24 for all l ∈ U(H) and
pi1(N, v,H) =
∑
l∈U(H)(1)
Shl(U(H), w) =
1
24
+
1
24
+
1
24
=
1
8
= pi2(N, v,H) = pi3(N, v,H),
pi4(N, v,H) =
∑
l∈U(H)(4)
Shl(U(H), w) = 3
1
24
+ 2
1
24
=
5
24
= pi5(N, v,H) = pi6(N, v,H).
So, this example shows that the position value can be expressed by the uniform hyperlink game.
By Definition 1 and the proof of Theorem 3.1, we note that η(H) is the key to guaranteeing
Eq. (4) in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Clearly, if we consider an integral multiple of η(H) instead
of η(H), Eq. (4) is still true. Based on this observation, we can construct the other induced
games from the original hypergraph game and describe the position value for the hypergraph
game by the induced games.
Definition 2. For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN and any positive integer k ≥ 1, let η(H) is the
least common multiple of the numbers in {|e| | e ∈ H} and ρ(k) = k · η(H). The k-augmented
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uniform hyperlink game (U(H)k, wk) is defined as follows.
U(H)k(i, e) = {(i, e, t) | t = 1, . . . , ρ(k) · |e|−1}, (6)
U(H)k(i) =
⋃
e∈Hi
U(H)k(i, e) and U(H)k(e) =
⋃
i∈e
U(H)k(i, e),
U(H)k =
⋃
i∈N
U(H)k(i) =
⋃
e∈H
U(H)k(e) (7)
wk(S) =
∑
R∈N/H[S]
v(R), for all S ⊆ U(H)k, (8)
where H[S] = {e ∈ H |U(H)k(e) ⊆ S}.
By the definition of the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game, we can obtain the following
strengthening of Theorem 3.1. Its proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1, so we omit it.
Theorem 3.2. For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN and any i ∈ N ,
pii(N, v,H) =
∑
l∈U(H)k(i)
Shl(U(H)
k, wk).
Clearly, when k = 1, the k-augmented uniform hyperlink game coincides with the uniform
hyperlink game, and Theorem 3.1 is a special case of Theorem 3.2 as well. This result will
serve to characterize the position value axiomatically for arbitrary hypergraph games in the
next subsection.
3.2 The axiomatic characterization of the position value
In this subsection we provide an axiomatic characterization of the position value for arbitrary
hypergraph communication situations.
Before we introduce the properties that fully characterize the position value, we first give the
following key lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any hypergraph game (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN , any i ∈ N , i ∈ e ∈ H and
l′ ∈ U(H)(e), we have
pii
(
N, v,H \ {e}) = ∑
l∈(U(H)\{l′})(i)
Shl
(
U(H) \ {l′}, wU(H)\{l′}
)
.
Proof. To show the result, we distinguish two cases depending on whether or not the least
common multiples η(H) and η(H \ {e}) are the same.
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Case 1. η(H \ {e}) = η(H). Then, by Theorem 3.1, we have
pii(N, v,H \ {e}) =
∑
l∈U(H\{e})(i)
Shl(U(H \ {e}), wU(H\{e})). (9)
Therefore, it is sufficient to show the following equality.∑
l∈U(H\{e})(i)
Shl(U(H \ {e}), wU(H\{e})) =
∑
l∈(U(H)\{l′})(i)
Shl(U(H) \ {l′}, wU(H)\{l′}). (10)
By the definition of U(H), we have U(H \ {e}) = U(H) \ U(H)(e) ⊆ U(H) \ {l′} for any
e ∈ H, where l′ ∈ U(H)(e). So, for any K ⊆ U(H) \ {l′}, it follows from the definition of
w that wU(H)\{l′}(K) = wU(H\{e})(K ∩ U(H \ {e})) = w(K). This means that the players in
U(H, l′) = U(H) \ {l′} \U(H \ {e}) are null players of wU(H)\{l′}. Hence, it is easy to see that
Shl(U(H) \ {l′}, wU(H)\{l′}) =
{
Shl(U(H \ {e}), wU(H\{e})) if l ∈ U(H \ {e}),
0 if l ∈ U(H, l′). (11)
This implies that Eq. (10) holds.
Case 2. η(H \ {e}) 6= η(H). Since both η(H) and η(H \ {e}) are the least common multiples
of the numbers in {|e′| | e′ ∈ H} and {|e′| | e′ ∈ H \ {e}}, respectively, η(H) = |e| · η(H \ {e}).
Therefore, by Theorem 3.2, we have
pii(N, v,H \ {e}) =
∑
l∈U(H\{e})k(i)
Shl(U(H \ {e})k, wkU(H\{e})k). (12)
where k = |e|. Thus, it is sufficient to show the following equality.∑
l∈U(H\{e})k(i)
Shl(U(H \ {e})k, wkU(H\{e})k) =
∑
l∈(U(H)\{l′})(i)
Shl(U(H) \ {l′}, wU(H)\{l′}).
The following proof is similar to the proof described in Case 1, and is left to the reader.
Summing up the two cases, it completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
The position value can be expressed by employing the Harsanyi dividends. Firstly, the
uniform hyperlink game (U(H), w) associated with a hypergraph communication situations
(N, v,H) can be represented by a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e.,
w =
∑
K⊆U(H)
λK(w)uK . (13)
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By Theorem 3.1, the position value for (N, v,H) can be expressed in terms of the unanimity
coefficients, i.e., Harsanyi dividends, of the associated uniform hyperlink game. Formally, for
any i ∈ N , we have
pii(N, v,H) =
∑
l∈U(H)(i)
Shl(U(H), w)
=
∑
l∈U(H)(i)
∑
K⊆U(H):l∈K
λK(w)
|K|
=
∑
K⊆U(H)
λK(w)
|Ki|
|K| (14)
where Ki = K ∩ U(H)(i) and the second equality follows from the alternative description of
the Shapley value.
We now give the following properties for an allocation rule f . The first property is a standard
property, called component efficiency, which already was used to characterize the Myerson value
for communication situations, including graph games, conference structures and hypergraph
games (Myerson (1977, 1980) and van den Nouweland et al. (1992)). It was also used to
characterize the position value for graph games (Slikker (2005)) and cycle-free hypergraph
games (van den Nouweland et al. (1992)).
Component efficiency: For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN and any T ∈ N/H, it holds that∑
i∈T
fi(N, v,H) = v(T ).
The second property, called partial balanced conference contributions, is developed from the
balanced link contributions. The balanced link contributions is used to characterize the position
value for graph games in Slikker (2005) and can be expressed as follows.
Balanced link contributions: For any (N, v, L) and any i, j ∈ N , it holds that∑
e∈Lj
[fi(N, v, L)− fi(N, v, L \ {e})] =
∑
e∈Li
[fj(N, v, L)− fj(N, v, L \ {e})].
A natural extension of the above property to hypergraph games is the “balanced hyperlink
contributions” (or called balanced conference contributions), which can be given by
Balanced conference contributions: For any (N, v,H) and any i, j ∈ N , it holds that∑
e∈Hj
[fi(N, v, L)− fi(N, v, L \ {e})] =
∑
e∈Hi
[fj(N, v, L)− fj(N, v, L \ {e})].
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However, we note that the obvious extension fails to characterize the position value axiomati-
cally for hypergraph games and this point will be shown in Example 2. For solving the character-
ization problem of the position value for hypergraph games, we introduce the partial balanced
conference contributions. The partial balanced conference contributions also deals with the
gains players contribute to each other. When a hyperlink related to a player is broken or built,
the threat or contribution of another player received is not only depending on the first player,
but also depending on those players whom adjacent to the first player according to the broken
or built hyperlink. Formally, the property can be expressed as follows.
Partial balanced conference contributions: For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN and any i, j ∈
N , it holds∑
e∈Hj
1
|e| [fi(N, v,H)− fi(N, v,H \ {e})] =
∑
e∈Hi
1
|e| [fj(N, v,H)− fj(N, v,H \ {e})].
The partial balanced conference contributions states that the contribution or threat from a
player towards another player equals the reverse contribution or threat, where the contribution
or threat of a player towards another player is the sum of a portion payoff differences a player
can inflict on another player by building or breaking one of his hyperlinks. In particular, if H
is r-uniform, then the property coincides with the balanced conference contributions. But, in
general, this property is obviously different from the balanced hyperlink contributions.
We are ready to show that the position value for the hypergraph games satisfies the two
properties we mentioned above.
Lemma 3.2. The position value for hypergraph communication situations satisfies component
efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions.
Proof. It has been verified that the position value satisfies component efficiency by van den
Nouweland et al. (1992). We next show that the position value satisfies partial balanced con-
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ference contributions. Let (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN and i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j. Then we have∑
e∈Hj
1
|e| [pii(N, v,H)− pii(N, v,H \ {e})]
=
∑
e∈Hj
|U(H)(j, e)|
η(H)
[pii(N, v,H)− pii(N, v,H \ {e})]
=
1
η(H)
∑
e∈Hj
∑
l∈U(H)(j,e)
[ ∑
K⊆U(H)
λK(w)
|Ki|
|K| −
∑
K⊆U(H)\{l}
λK(w)
|Ki|
|K|
]
=
1
η(H)
∑
l∈U(H)(j)
∑
K⊆U(H):l∈K
λK(w)
|Ki|
|K|
=
1
η(H)
∑
K⊆U(H)
|Kj |λK(w) |Ki||K|
=
1
η(H)
∑
K⊆U(H)
λK(w)
|Ki| · |Kj |
|K|
=
∑
e∈Hi
1
|e| [pij(N, v,H)− pij(N, v,H \ {e})],
where the first equality follows from the definition of U(H)(j, e) and l ∈ U(H)(j, e), the second
equality follows from Eq. (14) and Lemma 3.1 (note that λK(wU(H)\{l}) = λK(w) for any
K ⊆ U(H) \ {l} ⊆ U(H)), and the last equality follows from the symmetry of player i and
j.
The following example illustrates that the position value satisfies the partial balanced con-
ference contributions.
Example 2. Consider the hypergraph game as described in Example 1. The payoffs for several
(sub-)hypergraphs according to the position value are shown as follows.
pi(N, v,A) =
{
(18 ,
1
8 ,
1
8 ,
5
24 ,
5
24 ,
5
24) A = H,
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) A ( H.
By the definition of the partial balanced conference contributions, the total contribution of player
6 to player 1 equals 12(
1
8 − 0) + 13(18 − 0) = 548 , by breaking the hyperlink e3 and e4, respectively.
The reverse contribution of player 1 to player 6 equals 12(
5
24 − 0) = 548 as well. Hence, the
position value satisfies the partial balanced conference contributions. However, this example
also shows that the position value does not satisfies the balanced conference contributions. To
be specific, the contribution of player 6 to player 1 equals (18−0)+(18−0) = 24 , while the reverse
contribution of player 1 to player 6 equals 524 − 0 = 524 .
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We now can provide a characterization of the position value by Lemma 3.2. Its proof is
similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Slikker (2005) which characterizes the position value for
arbitrary (graph) communication situations.
Theorem 3.3. The position value for hypergraph communication situations is the unique allo-
cation rule that satisfies component efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, it is proved that the position value for hypergraph games satisfies com-
ponent efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions. It remains to show that the
position value is the unique value that satisfies the two properties. Suppose f is an allocation
rule satisfies the two properties, we show that f = pi. We proceed by induction on |H|. For
|H| = 0, the assertion immediately follows from component efficiency. Next we may assume
that f coincides with the position value pi if |H| ≤ k − 1. We consider the case when |H| = k.
For any component C ∈ N/H, let C = {1, 2, . . . , c}. We can obtain the following system of
linearly independent equations by the two properties and the hypothesis,∑
e∈H2
1
|e|f1(H)−
∑
e∈H1
1
|e|f2(H) =
∑
e∈H2
1
|e|pi1(H \ {e})−
∑
e∈H1
1
|e|pi2(H \ {e}),
· · ·∑
e∈Hc
1
|e|f1(H)−
∑
e∈H1
1
|e|fc(H) =
∑
e∈Hc
1
|e|pi1(N, v,H \ {e})−
∑
e∈H1
1
|e|pic(H \ {e}),
∑
i∈T
f(N, v,H) = v(T ),
where write fi(H) and fi(H \ {e}) instead of fi(N, v,H) and fi(N, v,H \ {e}), respectively, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , c. One may easily verify that the above system has a unique solution. Since the
position value satisfies component efficiency and partial balanced conference contributions, the
position value is a solution of the above system. Consequently, we conclude that f = pi for any
hypergraph communication situations with |H| = k.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provides the non-axiomatic characterization and axiomatic characterization of
the position value for arbitrary hypergraph communication situations. Here the non-axiomatic
characterization is in line with the works of Casajus (2007) and Kongo (2010), in which non-
characterizations of the position are provided by the Myerson value and the Shapley value of
modifications of communication situations, respectively. Casajus (2007) expressed the position
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value for hypergraph communication situations in terms of the Myerson value by applying the
hyperlink agent form (HAF). We now give a comparison between the expressions of the position
value in Casajus (2007) and in our paper.
We first recall the definition of the hyperlink agent from HAF (N, v,H) = (N¯ , v¯, H¯), where
the player set is
N¯ =
⋃
i∈N
N¯(i), N¯(i) =
⋃
h∈Hi
N¯(i, h), N¯(i, h) = {(i, h, k) | k = 1, 2, . . . , η(H) · |h|−1},
and the set of hyperlinks is
H¯ = H¯o ∪
⋃
i∈N
LN¯(i), H¯o = {h¯ |h ∈ H}, h¯ =
⋃
i∈h
N¯(i, h),
and the characteristic function is
v¯(K¯) = v(N(K¯)), N(K¯) = {i ∈ N | N¯(i) ∩ K¯ 6= ∅}.
According to the definitions of the HAF and the uniform hyperlink game, it is easy to check
that the differences between the two induced games lies in two aspects: the structures and the
characteristic functions. However, somewhat surprisingly, we have the following relationships
between them.
Corollary 4.1. For any (N, v,H) ∈ HCSN , and the uniform hyperlink game (U(H), w),
hyperlink agent form (HAF) (N¯ , v¯, H¯) defined on it, we have Sh(U(H), w) = µ(N¯ , v¯, H¯).
Proof. By the definition of the player sets U(H) and N¯ and the Myerson value, it is sufficient
to show that w(S) = v¯H¯(S) for any S ⊆ U(H) = N¯ .
In fact, for any S ⊆ N¯ , we have
v¯H¯(S) =
∑
C∈S/H¯
v¯(C) =
∑
C∈S/H¯
v(N(C)) =
∑
C∈N(S)/H[S]
v(C) =
∑
C∈N/H[S]
v(C) = w(S),
where the third equation follows from the definition of H¯ and H[S], and the fourth equation
holds by the zero-normalized game.
Even though this corollary shows that the Shapley payoff of the uniform hyperlink game and
the Myerson payoff of the HAF coincide with each other, the uniform hyperlink game seems
to be more concise than HAF, more importantly, the uniform hyperlink game can provide a
powerful assistance in characterizing the position value for arbitrary hyperlink communication
situations.
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